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The Role of Civil Service Attorneys and Political
Appointees in Making Policy in the Civil Rights
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice·

Brian K. Landsberg••

In 1957, Attorney General William P. Rogers created the Civil
Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice. 1 He
did so in response to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1957,
the first federal civil rights law since Reconstruction. During the
next three-and-a-half decades, Congress enacted numerous additional laws forbidding discrimination and conferred on the
Department of Justice authority to bring enforcement actions in
federal court.2 Although the Constitution and the laws of the
United States are clear in forbidding various forms of discrimination, numerous issues of legal interpretation have been left, in the
first instance, to the courts. This has thrust the Civil Rights
Division into the policy arena-not only setting priorities, but also
selecting legal positions on a variety of unsettled issues. These issues have ranged from the development of remedies for violations
of voting rights to busing and affirmative action in employment.
During my twenty-two years as a civil servant in the Civil
Rights Division, I observed the process of policy making from a
variety of vantage points-as a trial attorney, member of a planning unit, head of the Education Section and head of the
Appellate Section. While the Civil Rights Division's responsibilities
differ from those of other litigating divisions, I believe that com mon issues affect policy making in all the divisions. This essay focuses on the Civil Rights Division, the fount of many of the policy
decisions that have faced the Justice Department over the past
• This essay expands on some ideas which appeared in Brian K. Landsberg, Civil Rights,
After Meese, Nat'l L.f., Sept. 12, 1988, at 13; Brian K. Landsberg, Book Review, 6 Const.
Commentary 165 (1989) (reviewing Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth Justice: The Solicito r
General and the Rule of Law ( 1987)).
•• Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Civil Rights
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 1964-86.
1 Department ofjustice Order No. 155-57,22 Fed. Reg. 10310 (1957).
2 A very helpful, albeit somewhat dated, summary of the Department's autho rity
appears in John Oakley, The United States as Participant in Public Interest Litigatio n:
Recent Developments, 13 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 247, 249-59 (1980) .
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thirty-five years and the Division most familiar to me.
My theses are simple. Both civil service attorneys and political
appointees influence policy. Wise policy requires cooperation between the two groups. When one group shuts itself out from influence by the other, the Department's policy suffers. In this essay, I attempt to begin consideration of these issues and some
corollary points, as well as raise questions for further study.
First, I would like to present some basic descriptive information
about the two groups in order to set the foundation for understanding their relative roles. Two obvious distinguishing features
are their method of selection and their tenure. The Attorney
General, Solicitor General and Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights are appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. They may select a small number of non-career assistants. In contrast, the members of the civil service are selected through a facially non-political process. While attorneys do
not take a civil service examination, the law requires that they be
hired based solely on merit, without regard for political affiliation. 3 The tenure of most political appointees will be no longer
than that of the President who appointed them; typically it is
shorter. Since the creation of the Civil Rights Division of the
Justice Department in 1957, eight persons have served as President
of the United States and fifteen have served as Attorney General. 4
In contrast to this high turnover of political appointees, civil service lawyers serve as a source of stability. Although hundreds of
civil service lawyers have passed through the Division during the
past thirty-five years, careers of twenty or thirty years are not
uncommon among this cadre.
Many have written about the Civil Rights Division and its political leadership. However, most studies of policy making in civil
rights law enforcement have paid scant attention to the civil service lawyer. Some mention of the civil servant accompanies
commentaries on the occasional cause celebre, such as the delay of
desegregation in Mississippi in 1969 5 or the volte-face in the Bob
Jones University case in 1981.6 Also, it is not uncommon for political
3 5 U.S.C.A §§ 2~1(b)(1)-(2), 2302(b)(E) (West Supp. 1992).
4 See Justice Management Division, U.S. DepL oflustice, 200th Anniversary of the Office
of the Attorney General ii (1990) (The fifteen Attorneys General include those listed
therein, from William Rogers to Dick Thornburgh, plus President Bush's Attorney General,
William Barr, who is not listed.).
5 See Gary Orfield, Must We Bus? 326 (1978).
6 See Philip Heymann &: Lance Liebman, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers 136
(1988); see also Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth justice: The Solicitor General and the Rule of
Law51-60 (1987).
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appointees to aim generalized barbs or praise at civil servants. 7 I
believe, however, that students of policy making in the
Department of Justice should conduct a more focused and thorough examination of the role and influence of civil servants. This
essay suggests a few areas of inquiry for further study.
My description of civil service lawyers is not based on an examination of the records of the Division, although such an examination might be revealing. Rather, I rely on personal impressions
formed during my twenty-two years there. It is sometimes said
that familiarity breeds contempt. In my case, however, familiarity with the Civil Rights Division lawyers has bred respect. 8 The
typical lawyer in the Division was a high achiever in law school,
and most were hired under the Attorney General's Honors
Program or from judicial clerkships. Most were attracted to the
Division because of their commitment to the laws which it enforces and because of the Division's general reputation as a good
place to gain experience in complex litigation. Many leave after a
few years, generally moving on to attractive jobs as litigators with
law firms or as United States Attorneys. One can count among the
alumni of the Civil Rights Division several federal judges, numerous law professors and many leaders of the bar. But another large
group makes the Civil Rights Division their career. They do so not
because they lack mobility, but because a variety of factors make
their jobs desirable. Chief among those factors is the feeling that
their work promotes justice. 9
The Civil Rights Division's type of work-litigation in federal
court-also tends to mold those who do it. Early in the Division's
7 An egregious example of such a barb appears in Charles Fried's account of his tenure as
Solicitor General, where he states that the career lawyers in the Civil Rights Division
"sabota~ed [Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds'] rightful claim to leadership 10 every way they could. " Charles Fried, Order and Law: Arguing the Reagan
Revolution-A Firsthand Account 41 (1991). To his credit, Professor Fried has since expressed regret, acknowledging that he "saw little with [his) own eyes that would (justify his
remark]." Letter from O!arles Fried to Brian Landsberg (Aug. 3, 1991) (letter on file with
author).
8 Inevitably, in aJroup of 180 or so lawyers (the size of the Civil Rights Division in recent
years), one may fin an occasional drone or ideologue, but they are the rare exceptio n in
the Division and their influence has been negligible.
9 Jonathan Yardley describes my former colleague, the late Walter W. Barnett, thus:
Walter was that genuine and invaluable rarity, a true public servant. He entered government not to enrich his contacts and then spin through the revolving door into lucrative private practice, but to work for a cause in
which he believed and for people whom he felt had been deprived.
[Walter was) a wholly serious man, devoted to his work and convinced of
its importance .. . .
Jonathan Yardley, Two Good Men and True, Wash. Post, June 15, 1987, at C2.
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history it became apparent that success in civil rights litigation in
the deep South required extraordinary lawyering. Because many
trial court judges were unsympathetic, every case had to be tried
with the goal of providing compelling grounds for reversal by a
more balanced appellate court. 1 Further, Assistant Attorney
General John Doar stressed that Division attorneys must be the
epitome of rectangular rectitude; turning around the famous
Holmes phrase, 11 he required that government attorneys always
turn square corners. From these circumstances grew a tradition of
thoroughness and care that persists to the present day. 12 That
tradition disfavors knee-jerk responses to issues.
Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr. once described the difference between lawyers in
the Civil Rights Commission and those in the Civil Rights Division:
"One was an agency of recommendation and the other of action. "Ill Lawyers who began with similar backgrounds diverged in
their attitudes, depending on whether their role was gadfly or
litigator. In short, the Division has attracted employees looking
for more than just another job, people committed to equality under the law and to litigation as the engine of securing that right.
This configuration of the Division's enforcement staff does not
present the image of a runaway bureaucracy, totally out of touch
with reality. Nonetheless, some problems are inherent. First, the
job of the law enforcer is to find violations of the law and correct
them. Zeal to uncover wrongdoing may lead to a lack of rigor in
critically evaluating cases and positions. Second, the civil service
staff is hired by and serves under political appointees, each of
whom may seek to mold that staff into the image most compatible
with the policy views of the President. This may lead to a real or

°

10 'The Division was not prepared to take the terrible risk of losing a single case because
of lack of proof. We faced tough judges. We wanted the proof to be so overwhelming so
as to lock up the trial judge ... and to convince the country as well." Arthur Schlesinger,
Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times 301 (1978) (quoting John Doar & Dorothy Landsberg,
The Performance of the FBI 905-06 (I 97I) ).
11 See Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S. 14I, 143 {1920) ("Men must
turn square corners when they deal with the Government."); see also John M. Maguire &
Philip Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices in Federal Taxation, 48 Harv. L. Rev.
1281, 1299 (1935) ("[I]t is hard to see why the government should not be held to a like standard of rectangular rectitude when dealing with its citizens.").
l2 Most recently, President Bush recognized this tradition in his executive order con cerning civil justice reform:
[T]he United States sets an example for private litigation by adhering to
higher standards than those required by the rules of procedure in the conduct of Government litigation in Federal court, and can continue to do so
without impairing the effectiveness of its litigation efforts.
Executive Order 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991).
Ill VictorS. Navasky, Kennedy Justice 109 (1971).
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perceived lack of responsiveness to new leadership when ad ministrations change. Third, some civil service staff may develop a degree of expertise and a commitment to particular law enforcement
policies that can overwhelm a new leader. Fourth, civil service
staff may form alliances with outside groups concerned with the
Jaws that the staff enforces. 14 Fifth, "there are significant pressures
to place decisions beyond the control-even beyond the
consideration-of policy-making officials by identifying policy
questions as questions of law and therefore as peculiarly within
the province of the courts. "15 Finally, we know that, over time,
bureaucracies tend to ossify, lose their sense of purpose, look more
to the past than to the future, and reject new ideas because they
differ from what they have always done.
These characteristics are important because civil service
lawyers influence policy. Policy in the Department of Justice
primarily refers to litigation decisions. These include decisions to
sue or not sue, defend or capitulate, settle and appeal. The litigator must also decide how to litigate: what facts to stress, what theories to pursue and what relief to seek. These are discretionary decisions. 16 The Civil Rights Division is a party or amicus in over one
14 Former Deputy Attorney General Tyler believes that:
[S]ome offices and divisions within the Department of justice have informally affiliated with public pressure groups in our society. They feel that it
is incumbent upon them in their official capacity to be in cheek-to-jowl with
these groups, even to the extent of bringing them in to put on a "dog and
pony show"-as it is called in Washington-on the fifth or fourth floor of
the Department of Justice and sometimes even in the White House. This has
happened within the civil rights sphere, the antitrust sphere, and in other offices.
Daniel J. Meador, The President, the Attorney General, and the Department of Justice
108 (1980). Mr. Tyler seems to have drawn this conclusion from the pattern of advocacy
groups seeking an opportunity to convince him, the Attorney General or the Solicitor
General of the correctness of their position. Because that position sometimes corresponded
to the position of a litigating division, he assumes the advocacy group and the divisions
must have been acting in concert. On the other hand, when Mr. Tyler met with other advocacy groups, whose positions conflicted with those of a litigation division, he presumably
saw no such cabal. To equate similarity of position with conspiracy is illogical; to characterize advocacy group efforts to influence policy as improper dog and pony shows,"
while simultaneously giving audiences to other groups with whom one is more in tune is
simply improper. Mr. Tyler's position seems at odds with those of his former boss,
Attorney General Edward H. Levi, who believed strongly in "government by discussion ."
See Government by Discussion, infra pp. 28~286.
15 Ronald C. Carr, Mr. Levi at justice, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 300, 307 (1985). For example,
Professor Selig characterizes the Reagan administration's decision to dismiss the appeal of a
school desegregation case as "inconsistent with a commitment to the rule of law." Joel L.
Selig, The Reagan justice Department and Civil Rights: What Went Wrong?, 1985 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 785, 807.
16 See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev.
1276, 1312 (1984) ("Discretion appears within the bureaucracy as a supplement to its essentially objective functioning; discretion is added to the operation of bureaucracy in order to
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thousand ongoing suits. 17 It brings between one hundred and two
hundred new suits each year, 18 filing numerous briefs, motions and
pleadings. This work is done primarily by the roughly one
hundred eighty civil service lawyers. These lawyers are not
fungible, and absent some controls litigation decisions could turn
on which lawyer is assigned to the matter. The basic control is or
at least should be the law itself. For example, Congress did not
grant the Department of Justice carte blanche power to initiate
civil rights litigation. It withheld from the Department the right to
bring a civil suit seeking injunctive relief against patterns of police
brutality by a police department. 19 It defeated a proposal to allow the Department to bring civil actions to remedy racial discrimination in jury selection. 20 Even where such suits are authorized, Congress has attached limiting conditions.2 1 Finally, the
civil service lawyer must follow the substantive provisions of the
law as construed by the courts. Even with all these restraints,
however, the Division retains tremendous flexibility, both as to its
priorities and as to unsettled areas of the law. 22
Non-government lawyers typically labor under the most basic
restraint of all: the wishes of the client. But who is the client of
the government lawyer? As a District of Columbia Bar Committee
has pointed out, some argue that the government lawyer's responsibility is to the "public interest" and the client is "the people as a
whole," while others argue that the client is "the entire government."2S The Committee concluded, however, that "the employing agency should in normal circumstances be considered the
client of the government lawyer." If the employing agency is the
client, then ordinarily the lawyer will learn the client's wishes
from the political appointee (here, the Attorney General and
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights).2 4 This shift of dismake its objectivity possible. To be objective, the bureaucracy has to carry out the wishes
of its constituents, but to do so it must refer to their general intentions ('maximize profits')
or their specific commands ('fix prices'). Either reference requires the bureaucratic actors
to use their discretion.").
17 Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Case Management System Statistics Report
(Oct. 16,1992).
181d

19 See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187 (~d Cir. 1980) .
20 See H.R. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
21 For example, the Department of Justice must first receive a citizen complaint before
initiating a school desegregation action, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (1989), and the Attorney
General must sign the compfaint, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-5(a), 2000b(a), 2000e-6(a) (1989) .
22 See Meador, supra note 14, at 2S.29.
2 !1 Report by the District of Columbia Bar Special Committee on Government Lawyers
and The Model Rules of Professional Conduct,~ Wash. Law. 5~. 54 (1988).
24 I use the term "political appointee" in a non-pejorative sense to refer to officials nomi -
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cretion from one person (the civil service lawyer) to another (the
political appointee) allows democratic processes, rather than
mandarins, to determine what litigation decisions promote the
public interest.
Thus, we the people are the clients of the Department of
Justice, 25 and we entrust to the Attorney General and the political
appointees who serve under him control of the civil service attorneys. The political appointee must ensure that the civil service
lawyers enforce the law and that they do so in a manner consistent with administration policies, to the extent possible.26 Placing
the responsibility here does not end the problem which a former
general counsel of the Office of Management and Budget calls

nated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Some come from the world of poli tics. For example, two Assistant Attorneys General for Civil Rights came from positions as
state senators (Jerris Leonard from Wisconsin and John Dunne from New York), some were
lawyers in private practice who had supported the electoral winner (Harold Tyler, Burke
Marshall and]. Stanley Pottinger), and some were promoted from positions as deputy assistant attorney general (John Doar, Stephen Pollak and David L. Norman). In the Division's
early years, tile Eisenbower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations thought the Division
should maintain a neutral, disinterested, almost quasijudicial image. None of the men chosen to head the Civil Rights Division were identified with civil rights aims before taking offlee. See John T. Elliff, The United States Department of Justice and Individual Rights:
1937-62, ~46-50 (1987). Indeed, Attorney General Robert Kennedy's Director of Public
Information, Ed Guthman, believes that Kennedy decided "that someone who had been in
the forefront of any rights or racial cause might be handicapped by ideology or past associations in civil rights enforcement. • That led to the choice of Burke Marshall, an
"enlightened [Burkean] conservative, brilliant Yale lawyer." as Kennedy's Assistant
Attorney General for Civil Rights. Navasky, supra note 13, at 162.
25 Former Solicitor General Griswold states: "[M]y client was the United States. I did
not regard the President of the United States as my client, though he was my ultimate boss,
and my tenure was at his will." Erwin Griswold, Ould Fields, New Corne 327 (1992).
Other federal agencies are sometimes referred to as clients, but ultimate control over their
litigating positions lies with the Attorney General, not the "client agency.· See 28 U.S.C. §
516 (1989). Professor Selig argues that "[t]he Department's client is the law and the public
interest. • Selig, supra note 15, at 793. Both the open-ended nature of the law and the public interest, as well as their disembodied nature, argue against such a characterization.
26 As Professor Burke Marshall, a former Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, told
Congress:
[L]aw enforcement in this area [civil rights] demands policy direction . It
affects .the lives of millions of people and the emotions and passions of
millions of others. It seems right, not wrong, to me that an administration
give policy direction on such matters as busin~, employment quotas, school
distract consolidations, and private discrimmation in places of public
accommodations, as much as I disagree with the policy established by the
present administration in most of these areas.
Removing Politics from the Administration ofJustice, 1975: Hearings on S.2803 and S.2978
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. II4 (1974) (statement of Burke Marshall, Deputy Dean of the Yale Law
School). See also id. at 204 (statement of Archibald Cox, Williston Professor of Law,
Harvard University, and former Special Prosecutor in the Department of Justice). But see
Selig, supra note 14, at 793 ("Every enforcement decision the Department makes should
depend solely on the relevant law and facts, and not on extraneous political or ideological
considerations. j.
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"clientless lawyering. "27 Where lawyering is clientless the reins
which tether most lawyers are absent-the lawyer is both the
maker of policy and its advocate. Ideally, this should engender a
more serious sense of care and responsibility in the law enforcement officer, but the political appointee is subject to countervailing pressures having little to do with the law. 2 8
Yet the
Department of Justice must provide even-handed enforcement of
the Constitution and the laws that its lawyers are sworn to uphold. Abraham Lincoln's Attorney General, Edward Bates, put it
well: "[l]t is my duty, above all other ministers of State, to uphold the Law and to resist all encroachments, from whatever
quarter, of mere will and power. " 29 Although our understanding
of them may evolve, the meaning of the Constimtion and federal
laws cannot transmogrify every four or eight years with each new
President. If individual rights depended on presidential election
returns, we would become a nation of men and not laws.
From the above, it is clear that both the civil service employee
and the political appointee bring disadvantages to clientless
lawyering. The former has no claim to represent the wishes of
"we the people"; the latter may take a narrow, partisan view of
those wishes. The former may be tied to the positions of the past;
the latter may not be aware of the lessons of the past. One answer
to this dilemma is joint decisionmaking, building on the strengths
of each and on the responsibility that falls on each to execute
faithfully the laws of the United States. !IO Other answers-raw ex27 Review & Outlook: The Apostate Lawyer, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1986, at 24 (editorial)
(quoting Michael Horowitz, former general counsel to the Office of Management and
sudrt>.
2 1 recall a meeting in the office of President Reagan's Solicitor General, Rex Lee, early
in the Administration. We were discussing the position to be taken in the government's
brief in a case pendin~ before the Supreme Court. The political appointees of another
Department were argumg that our bnef should reverse the position taken in the lower
courts by the Carter Administration. Mr. Lee listened patiently, but seemed unpersuaded.
Finally, the proponents for a changed position pulled out their trump card: "But Mr.
Solicitor General, you must remember that we won the election." Fortunately, the law and
the facts trumped politics, and the government's brief in that case did not reverse our prior
position.
29 Homer Cummings & Carl McFarland, Federal Justice: Chapters in the History ofJustice
and the Federal Executive 499 (1937).
!IO Cf. Code of Ethics for Government Service, H. Con. Res. 175, 85th Con g., 2d Sess., 72
Stat. B12 (1958) (reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 7301, note), which states:
Any person in Government service should:
1. Put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to country above
loyalty to persons, party, or Government Department.
·2. Uphold the Constitution, laws, and legal regulations of the United
States and of all governments therein and never be a party to their evasion.
The Code also appears as an appendix to the Departme nt of Justice's Standards of
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ercise of political power or the creation of a completely apolitical
Department of Justice-would magnify one or the other prong of
the dilemma.
I believe that an empirical study would reveal that joint decisionmaking has been the norm in the Civil Rights Division. Of
course, the Attorney General, Solicitor General and Assistant
Attorney General for Civil Rights must have the final word, but
normally they have done so only after consulting with civil service attorneys. By and large, the two components of the Division
have recognized that both public interest and self interest dictate
cooperation. The political appointee's impact on policy will be
minimal unless she can enlist the aid of the career staff. Sheer volume ofwork, the need for expertise, and the maintenance of credibility with the courts and Congress all lead in the direction of
joint decisionmaking. Moreover, even if there are disagreements
about specific policies, both groups share a commitment to enforcement of the civil rights laws. The civil servant has other incentives to cooperate. Not only does the political appointee hold
the upper hand on matters such as promotions and assignments,
but the civil service attorney needs approval of the political appointee to file cases or briefs.
Other forces, however, lead to tension between the political
leader and the civil service follower. An understanding of this relationship between political and civil service attorneys might fruitfully be advanced by examining various models of law enforcement management. In this essay, I briefly describe two polar
models, fleshed out with reference to a few case histories (drawn
primarily from published accounts) that demonstrate how each
group responds to the tension between them. The case histories
span several administrations and different phases in the development of civil rights enforcement. No administration has followed
one model exclusively; the differences have been in emphasis.
Other models might be considered as well. ~ 1 Certainly a great
deal more study and thought should be devoted to these models if
we are to define the optimal relationship. ~ 2
Government by Discussion . Attorney General Edward H. Levi ,
who served under President Gerald Ford, espoused what he
Conduct, 28 C.F.R. Pan 45.
~ 1 One could contrast centralized and decentralized control; hands-<>n versus d elegated
leadership; and ad hoc versus programmed litigation decisions. One could also study the
variety of organizational structures which the Division has employed over the years and
their impact on policy setting.
~2 I hold a strong bias in favor of the first model, government by discussion.
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called a "government by discussion."S! In 1975, Solicitor General
Robert Bork wished to file a brief with the Supreme Court urging
the grant of certiorari in the Boston school desegregation case, M
because he felt the busing order in that case went too far. The
case was a cause celebre. Proponents and opponents of the lower
court decision vigorously lobbied the Department of Justice. Bork
sought the view of Assistant Attorney General Pottinger, who
headed the Civil Rights Division. Pottinger opposed the filing.
The Attorney General discussed the case with the President, presumably because the proposal related to the President's general
policy opposing school busing. The President wanted the
Department to make its own determination, 35 and there ensued a
period of intense deliberation within the Department. This was
not a case of civil servant versus political appointee; indeed, the
Attorney General simply sought the advice of the Solicitor
General, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, and civil service attorneys such as Deputy Solicitor General Lawrence Wallace
and myself (at the time, I was head of the Civil Rights Division's
Appellate Section). I am sure he consulted with others, such as his
special assistants, as well. I was impressed, first, by the freedom
we had to speak our minds freely and, second, by the focus of all
involved on the merits of the issue, rather than on the political
controversy swirling around us. In the end, the Attorney General
decided not to file the brief. However, the discussions ultimately
led to further meetings to discuss a legislative approach. Attorney
General Levi "led in the development of proposed legislation, under the direction of the President, designed to guide use of the
busing remedy in school desegregation cases in order to achieve
the purposes articulated in the courts' decisions while interfering
as little as possible with other values .. . . "36
Attorney General Levi was not, of course, the only Attorney
General to favor government by discussion. For example,
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy employed an open style of
leadership, and he called on a variety of career and political appointee attorneys for their views. 37 Similarly, early in the tenure
!1!1 See Carr, supra note 15, at 313.
M Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 {1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
35 See Meador, supra 14, at 85. But see Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The
Brethren 427 (1979) ("[T)here were reports that the Ford administration would come out
against busing. But when these reports were followed by more violence, the White House
decided not to intervene.").
ll6 Carr, supra 15, at 316. See also Orfield, supra note 5, at 353-54.
37 See Navasky, supra note 13, at 99 (discussions regarding voter discrimination litigation), 297-322 (discussions regarding Department's position in reapportionment cases);
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of Attorney General John Mitchell a free-flowing debate ensued as
to the shape of federal school desegregation policy. Career attorneys Bob Owen and Dave Norman joined Assistant Attorney
Generaljerris Leonard and officials of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare in these discussions, which resulted in "a
document that supported strong enforcement of the law. " 38
Government by discussion requires trust between the civil service lawyers and political appointees. Trust cannot exist without
some common denominator as to basic objectives, but it does not
require agreement as to subsidiary issues. Mutual trust will rarely
exist at the beginning of a new administration-it must be built.
Mutual trust is difficult to cultivate in Washington, D.C., where the
"leak" is a way of life and the significance of the leak tends to be
magnified out of all proportion to its actual importance. The
building of trust requires civil service attorneys to honor confidences, !19 and it requires political appointees to resist pointing the
finger when leaks occur. Civil service attorneys must be confident
that they will not be punished for expressing their views to the
political appointee, or the well-known dangers of Washington
sycophancy will insulate the political appointee from the range of
information and views needed to make wise choices.
No doubt such an atmosphere was easier to maintain in the
1960s, when the Division was small enough for the Assistant
Attorney General to spend time in the trenches with his troops,
and the common objectives of the career and political staff were
clearer than today. One answer to the problems occasioned by
the growth of staff and the diffusion of responsibilities and attitudes is effective use of a pyramidal organization. The Assistant
Attorney General and the civil service leadership (deputy assistant
attorneys general and section chiefs and their deputies) can create
or destroy an atmosphere of trust. If the political and civil service
leadership engage in cooperative law enforcement, the line
lawyers who work in the various litigation sections are likely to
follow that example.
Discussions may not always lead to the right decision, but involvement of civil service lawyers in the decision-making process
lends legitimacy to those decisions and motivates the civil service
lawyers to represent zealously the position of the Department.
Schlesinger, supra note 10, at 239-41.
38 Leon Panetta &. Peter Gall, Bring Us Together: The Nixon Team and the Civil Rights
Retreat 111-14 (1971).
!19 Arguably, the leaks may violate professional ethical norms as well. See, e.g., Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1983).
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Moreover, government by discussion will often prevent errors. 40
One of the many mistakes that led to the Bob jones University debacle during the Reagan administration was its failure to listen to
civil service attorneys from the Tax Division, Civil Rights Division,
Solicitor General's office and Department of Treasury. 41
Government by Fiat. Government by discussion in the Boston
school desegregation case during the Ford administration may
have been, in part, a reaction against government by fiat, 42 which
marked the Nixon administration's approach to busing. Busing
was not a politically popular remedy and the Nixon administration was firmly opposed to it. However, the Supreme Court required busing when it was deemed necessary to overcome the effects of past racial discrimination by school systems. 43 Following
the Court's decision in Davis v. Board of School Commissioners, many
large Southern city school systems that were placed under busing
plans challenged those plans in the higher courts. & one commentator described the situation: "The President ordered the Justice
Department to actively oppose busing plans. Instead of using the
Department to argue the conservative position on the unsettled issues of constitutional law, he attempted to use the Civil Rights
Division as a weapon against enforcement of the settled law. "44
There ensued a series of hasty, ill-informed misadventures by the
Division.
For example, twenty-four hours before the Nashville school desegregation case was to be argued before the United States court
of appeals, the Civil Rights Division moved for leave to file an amicus curiae brief which argued against busing. The court granted
the motion and invited the Division to present oral argument.
According to the court's opinion, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General K. William O'Connor, who drew the unenviable assignment, "had not had the opportunity to read the District Court
record in this case and was not aware in advance of hearing that
the claimed practical problems had never been presented to or
adjudicated by the District Judge. "45 In another case, Solicitor
General Griswold, ordered to support a stay of a busing order,
40 See Whitneyv. California, 274 U.S. 357,375 (1927) (Brandeis,]., concurring).

41 See Brian K. Landsberg, Book Review, 6 Con st. Commentary 165, 177-79 ( 1989)
(reviewing Caplan, supra note 6, at 51-56).
42 I describe two techniques of government by fiat: government by unilateral command
from the political appointee to the civil service lawyer and government by end run .
43 Davis v. Bd. of School Comm'n, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971).
44 Orfield, supra note 5, at 336.
45 Kelley v. Metro. County Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 732, 746 (6th Cir.), cen. denied, 409
u.s. 1001 (1972 ).
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could find no legal argument for a stay; Attorney General
Kleindienst alone signed the government's amicus brief urging a
stay. 46 These shenanigans did not harm the law, but they did
undermine judicial confidence in the Department ofjustice. They
also were very demoralizing to civil service attorneys in the
Department, who reacted by refusing to sign some briefs, sending
letters to newspapers, signing a statement of opposition and resigning.47
Another technique of government by fiat is the end run, in
which normal procedures are breached in order to avoid discussion of proposed courses of action. Early in the Reagan administration, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights stated his
opposition to employment quotas, goals and timetables. 48
Apparently dissatisfied with the civil service staffs responsiveness
to his announcement, Assistant Attorney General William
Bradford Reynolds hired non-civil service attorneys and authorized them to act independent of the normal Department structure. Thus, for example, the Department took the unusual, though
not unheard of, step of intervening in a fair employment suit in
the court of appeals in order to seek an en bane rehearing of the
panel decision. The panel had reversed a district court order refusing to enter an affirmative action consent decree.
The
Department's filing was a secret operation handled by two noncivil service attorneys who did not consult with the Division personnel normally responsible for employment cases and appeals
until the eve of filing. 49 Unlike the Department's brief in the
Nashville school desegregation case, 50 the Department filed
46 Griswold, supra note 25, at ~19 (1992). Griswold misidentifies the case as involving
Montgomery County, Md. schools; it actually involved Prince George's County, Md.
schools. See Memorandum of the United States, Vaughns v. Bd. of Educ., 410 U.S. 918
(1973) (denying stay); 410 U.S. 910 (197~) (denying cert. to 468 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1972)).
Griswold notes that in another case he 'could not vigorously support the position of the
United States' as to the delay of school desegregation in Mississtppi and he, therefore,
'assigned the case for oral argument to the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights
Division,Jerris Leonard.' Griswold, supra note 25, at 273. Griswold was fired by President
Nixon in the summer of 197~. at the conclusion of the Supreme Court's October 1972 term.
Id. at 317.
47 See Orfield, supra note 5, at 3~8-40 (Orfield refers, inter alia, to me: 'The head of the
Civil Rights Division s education section, Brian Landsberg, found that he could not, in good
conscience, sign a number of the briefs submitted in major school desegregation cases.'
Memorandum from Brian Landsberg to Assistant Attorney General Pottinger (Oct. 12,
1972.)).
48 See Norman C. Amaker, Civil Rights and the Reagan Administration 124 (1988) .
49 The case was Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane).
I was one of the persons not timely consulted. The Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission prepared a brief supporting entry of the consent decree, but was dissuaded by
the Administration from filing it. Id. at 1572 n.5 (Wisdom,]., dissenting).
5 Kelly v. Metro. County Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 7~2 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
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lawyerlike papers in this case and it partially prevailed in the
court of appeals. The costs of maintaining these shadow Civil
Rights Division attorneys, who were referred to by civil service
lawyers as commissars, include inefficiency, lack of balanced consideration of positions and poor morale among the civil service attorneys. Such an expression of distrust breeds dis trust in re turn. 51
The advantages of such a dual system include its effectiveness in
developing expertise among non-civil service attorneys, its
responsiveness to an administration's agenda, 52 and its implicit
warning to civil service lawyers to conform or leave. Aside from
the issue of whether the advantages are outweighed by the disadvantages, one might also ask whether, in light of the availability of
other techniques of governing, government by fiat is necessary.
Although government by unilateral command is available only
to the political appointee, government by end run may at times be
available to the civil service lawyer as well. The political appointee is physically incapable of monitoring every court appearance and every court filing. When the goals of the political appointee and the civil service lawyers differ radically, the latter
may be tempted to become a loose cannon. A well-known example is the oral argument of a civil service lawyer in the court of
appeals shortly after the Mississippi school desegregation debacle,
where the lawyer publicly chastised the Attorney General. 55
Occasional examples might be unearthed of civil service lawyers
soliciting invitations from federal judges for the government to
participate in litigation, where the political appointees might have
resisted sua sponte participation by the government. Non-responsiveness to policy direction is an indirect form of the end run. For
example, during the Nixon and Ford administrations one section
of the Department had avoided bringing systemic cases and had
concentrated on cases of individual discrimination. On taking office, Assistant Attorney General Days ordered that systemic cases
1001 (1972).
51 Sissela Bok eloquently described the costs of secrecy: "(Secrecy] can debilitate judgment, first of all, whenever it shuts out criticism and feedback, leading people to become
mired d own in stereotyped, unexamined, often erroneous beliefs and ways of thinking.
Neither their perception of a problem nor their reasoning about it then receives the ben efit
of challenge and exposure." Sissela Bok, Secrets 25 (1982). She also points out the divisiveness of secrecy: "(W]hile secrecy may heighten a sense of equality and brotherhood among
persons sharing the secret, it can fuel gross intolerance and hatred toward outsiders." Id. at
28.
52 Sissela Bok notes that "[s]ecrecy is as indispensable to human beings as fire." Id . at 18.
Her explanation includes the following, which is applicable to the Department ofJustice:
"Secrecy for plans is needed, not only to protect their formulation but also to develop
them, perhaps to change them, at times to execute them, even to give them up." Id. at 23.
55 See Panetta&: Gall, supra note ~B. at 296.
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were to be given the highest priority. However, the attorneys in
that section continued to produce individual cases rather than systemic ones. I remember that, in the end, Mr. Days had to disapprove a meritorious appeal of an individual case in order to enforce his policy.
Much remains to be learned about the interaction of the civil
service attorney and the political appointee. 54 But I am satisfied
that this much is true: It has long been recognized that "of all manifestations of power, restraint impresses men most. " 55 The political
appointee and the civil service attorney in the Department of
Justice each possess considerable power. Each labors under the
awesome r esponsibility of enforcing the laws of the nation.
Government by discussion draws on the strengths of each group to
produce proper restraint in setting of law enforcement policy.
Government by fiat tends to abandon restraint, because each element of the Department ignores the legitimate concerns of the
other.

54 United States v. Lovett, 416 F.2d ~86 (8th Cir. 1969) (en bane). Some examples of
unanswered questions include the following: First, who aTe the civil service lawyers? Are
they drones? Ideologues? Eunuchs? Dedicated and able public servants? Second, what
power do they possess to influence policy? Are they the de facto policymakers? Neutral
tools in the hands of political appointees? Partners in policy? Another branch in the system of checks and balances? Third, what forces influence the professional conduct of civil
service lawyers? Finally, how should political appointees interact with the civil service
lawyers and what should the civil service lawyers do when they disagree with the political
ap~ointee?

5 Attributed to Thucydides. See The Practical Cogitator 461 (Charles Curtis, Jr. & Ferris
Greenslet eds., ~ ed. 1975).

